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Purpose Holistic approaches to public health such as ‘One Health’ emphasize the 
interconnectedness between people, animals, ecosystems, and epidemic risk, and many 
advocate for this philosophy to be adopted within disaster risk management (DRM). 
Historically, animal and human diseases have been managed separately from each other, and 
apart from other hazards considered for DRM. Shifts in DRM, however, may complement a 
One Health approach. The taxonomy of hazards considered under DRM has expanded to 
include medical and social crises such as epizootics and terrorism. However, there is a gap in 
understanding how epidemic risk is integrated into DRM at the community-level. 
 
Approach TACTIC adopts a participatory case study approach examining preparedness for 
multiple hazard types (floods, epidemics, earthquakes, and terrorism) at the community-level. 
This article reports on findings from the epidemic case study which took as its focus the 2001 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) epidemic in the UK because of the diverse human, social, 
and environmental impacts of this ‘animal’ disease.   
 
Findings Epizootic preparedness tends to focus on biosecurity and phytosanitary measures, 
and is geared towards agriculture and farming. Greater engagement with public health and 
behavioral sciences to manage public health impacts of animal disease epidemics, and 
activities for citizen engagement to improve preparedness are discussed. The impermeability 
of boundaries (hazard, institutional, disciplinary, etc.) is a key constraint to integrating One 
Health into DRM.  
 
Originality This work helps to situate the One Health discussion within the community-level 
DRM context.  
 























The One Health concept draws attention to the interconnectedness between people, animals, 
ecosystems, and public health, emphasizing the importance of a holistic approach that 
considers these relationships to improve wellbeing and reduce epidemic risk (Coker et al., 
2011; Dhama et al., 2013; Zinsstag et al., 2011). New infectious diseases emerge from a 
‘complex set of multifactoral circumstances including population growth, globalization of 
trade, changes in nutritional, agricultural, and trade practices, shifts in land-use including 
accelerated urbanization, deforestation, and encroachment on wildlife’ (Coker et al., 2011: 
326). Climate change and land-use change alter the range of vector-borne diseases and 
microbial conditions, and antimicrobial resistance among zoonotic bacteria alongside the use 
of antibiotics in the treatment of animals, posing further uncertainty and challenges for 
epidemic preparedness (Dhama et al., 2013). Consequently, these circumstances overlap as 
driving factors for, or may have other negative consequences contributing to, disaster risk 
from ‘natural’1 hazards and other hazard types, motivating the recommendation that a One 
Health philosophy be adopted within disaster risk management (DRM) (Dhama et al., 2013).     
Epizootics such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) affect animal populations and 
cannot be transmitted to humans. In contrast, zoonotic diseases can be transmitted from 
animals to humans. When a disease outbreak becomes widespread, within one or a few 
countries, for example, it is considered an epidemic. Pandemics occur when a disease 
outbreak spreads to numerous countries, or globally. Roughly two-thirds of all human 
pathogens are zoonotic, and approximately three-fourths of new and re-emerging infectious 
diseases are zoonotic, for example, avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS), West Nile Virus (WNV), and A H1N1 pandemic influenza (Coker et al., 2011). 
Many of these diseases are classified as Transboundary Animal Diseases (TADs) because 
they pose significant health, economic, and food security risks to a number of countries, can 
easily reach epidemic proportions, and require the cooperation of a number of countries for 
disease control and prevention (FAO-OIE, 2004).   
Historically, epizootics and zoonotics have been managed separately from each other, 
and apart from other types of hazards considered for DRM. The frequency and severity of 
disasters over the past decade, however, has motivated many countries to rethink and 
reorganize DRM in ways that may be complementary to a One Health approach. Civil 
contingencies planning in many European countries, for example, now lists medical and 
social crises including epizootics and terrorism alongside ‘natural’ and technological hazards 
within the taxonomy of hazards managed under DRM (Alexander, 2003). Incorporating 
medical and social crises into the hazard taxonomy for DRM may be a positive step towards 
One Health, however many obstacles remain. Historically, different hazard types have been 
approached and managed via different social, conceptual, and institutional frames. The 
evidence base therefore is limited with regards to the benefits of an integrated versus sectoral 
approach to DRM. Furthermore, an integrated approach requires a high degree of ‘border-
work’, that is, linking scholarship and practice across different boundaries (disciplinary, 
institutional, hazard, operational, etc.) (Horlick-Jones and Sime, 2004). Decentralization of 
hazard governance under civil contingencies planning has shifted greater responsibility for 
DRM onto the community-level, thus there may a similar lack of evidence and guidance for a 
community-led DRM approach. 
The overall aim of the TACTIC project is to increase preparedness to large-scale and 
cross-border disasters amongst communities and societies in Europe. To achieve this, 
TACTIC will consider studies on risk perception and preparedness (including good practices 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  term	  ‘natural’	  hazards	  is	  generally	  used	  to	  indicate	  naturally	  occurring	  threats	  such	  as	  floods,	  earthquakes,	  landslides,	  drought,	  etc.	  however,	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  hazards	  are	  typically	  measured	  on	  human	  populations.	  	  
and preparedness programs) in order to develop a participatory community preparedness self-
assessment enabling communities to assess impacts in a multi-hazard context, and their 
motivations and capacities to prepare for large-scale and/or cross-border disasters. This forms 
the basis for developing context-sensitive education and training strategies and practices that 
are embedded in an overarching long-term learning framework for increasing the overall 
prepares of communities and societies across Europe. Rather than taking a top-down 
approach to preparedness, TACTIC will pursue a collaborative project strategy by including 
different user and stakeholder groups in the development, testing and validation of tools and 
materials throughout the process of the project by conducting four case studies focusing on 
terrorism, floods, epidemics/pandemics and earthquakes2. Project outcomes and resources are 
synthesized in a freely available online platform.  
This article reports on key findings from the epidemics case study, which took as its 
focus the 2001 FMD epidemic in the UK. The 2001 FMD epidemic was the single largest 
animal epidemic the world has ever experienced, and one of the most serious epidemics the 
UK has experienced in modern times (Rossides, 2002: 831). Additionally, it was the first 
major crisis to occur under the ‘devolved’ governance (McConnell and Stark, 2002). Severity 
of flooding in 2000 and the 2001 FMD epidemic were important motivators for major policy 
reforms in the UK, including the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004, and the National Health 
Service (NHS) Emergency Planning Guidance in 2005 (Achour et al., 2015). Response to a 
consequent FMD outbreak in 2007 was much more successful, resulting in the slaughter of 
far fewer animals (2,160 vs. 6.5 million), at lesser expense to the government (£47 million vs. 
£3 billion in direct costs) (Anderson, 2008). The TACTIC case study uses the 2001 FMD 
epidemic as the reference event from which to learn how communities3 can better prepare for 
and learn from similarly complex threats. 
Results of the case study recommend that, whilst many positive gains have been made 
in terms of government led operational response and policy changes, community engagement 
and community-level preparedness requires greater attention. Improvements to risk 
communication, and greater recognition of the diverse human, social, and environmental 
impacts of ‘animal’ diseases are needed to improve preparedness. Epizootic management 
tends to be siloed outside of the day-to-day DRM context for community members who are 
not engaged with agriculture or farming, which may limit risk awareness. Preparedness 
remains largely focused on operational response, which is led by central government, and 
veterinary sciences. Preparedness activities tend to be geared toward specific groups such as 
farmers and agricultural workers, and pertain to biosecurity and phytosanitary measures 
aimed at reducing the occurrence and transmission of diseases. Whilst these strategies are 
necessary and beneficial, they do not engage with the potential human, social, and 
environmental impacts of ‘animal’ diseases, nor to they foster community-wide engagement 
in preparedness. Greater engagement across boundaries (disciplinary, hazard, institutional, 
livelihoods, etc.) is needed to raise awareness of preparedness and motivate community-wide 
engagement in epidemic preparedness, whether epidemics arise from human or animal 
diseases. Engaging with public health to manage the public health impacts of ‘animal’ disease 
epidemics, and learning from community-led initiatives that were vital in coping during the 
2001 FMD epidemic, would help to improve preparedness levels. Community-led informal 
networks and support initiatives that sprang up during the 2001 FMD event played an 
instrumental role in recording public health impacts and supporting those affected through a 
very traumatic event. Citizen panels similarly played a role in identifying and monitoring the 
diverse impacts of the 2001 FMD epidemic. Many lessons were identified that could improve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Details	  regarding	  the	  TACTIC	  Project	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  project	  website	  at	  http://www.tacticproject.eu.	  3	  Communities	  here	  refers	  to	  geographic	  regions	  with	  a	  shared	  responsibility	  for	  DRM.	  
risk communication, and assist communities in coping with impacts such as social isolation 
and fragmentation of social networks. Community-level preparedness strategies are not well 
recognized as an element of contingency planning. TACTIC’s tools were perceived as being 
useful for strengthening risk communication and creating a preparedness baseline. 
Nevertheless, the impermeability of boundaries (hazard, institutional, disciplinary, policy) 
remains a key challenge for to an integrated approach to DRM, and to adopting holistic 
philosophies such as One Health. 
 
1.0.1 Background 
1.0.2 FMD  
FMD is an infectious viral disease that replicates rapidly, is highly contagious, and can affect 
a wide range of domestic and free-living ungulates (hoofed mammals) (Thomson and Bastos, 
2002). FMD is a TAD that is endemic (regularly found) in two-thirds of the world and is 
currently the single largest constraint to international trade in animal products (Rweyemamu 
et al., 2009: 73).   
The UK maintains ‘disease free’ status with regards to FMD. Disease free status 
indicates that a disease is not endemic in a country, however this does not mean that the 
disease cannot be introduced through contaminated animals or animal products, for example. 
To maintain disease free status, a country must actively control disease outbreaks and 
conform to international trade and phytosanitary guidelines. Many disease free countries 
follow a ‘stamping-out’ (culling) policy for disease control. ‘Stamping-out’ policy generally 
includes slaughtering infected animals, animals that may have come in contact with infected 
animals, as well as animals in neighboring premises that may be susceptible to infection. 
Movement bans prohibiting movement of animals within or between farms, and which 
restrict access of the general public into infected or suspected areas of infection, are also 
commonly enforced (Rweyemamu et al., 2009). Depending on the characteristics of the 
epidemic, for example, severe weather conditions or extended animal movement bans, 
animals often are slaughtered for welfare reasons. Governments typically provide financial 
compensation to farmers whose livestock are slaughtered, however, compensation varies 
depending on the government and disease type. Indirect costs from disease control measures 
such as biosecurity activities and other losses incurred from business disruption are 
frequently borne by the famers (Hoag et al., 2006). Vaccination for FMD is used as a disease 
control measure in some countries, but remains controversial in others (Rossides, 2002). 
The 2001 FMD epidemic in the UK was the most serious epidemics the UK has 
experienced in modern times (Rossides, 2002: 831). The last major FMD epidemic in the UK 
occurred in 1967-68, resulting in the slaughter of over 400,000 animals whereas the 2001 
epidemic resulted in the slaughter of 4 million animals for disease control purposes and an 
additional 2.5 million that were killed on welfare grounds (Rossides, 2002). Total direct and 
indirect costs for the UK for the 2001 event were estimated at £8 billion (Anderson, 2008). 
The severity of the 2001 FMD epidemic is attributed largely to delayed reporting and 
response time. There was one source case, however identification came 3 weeks after 
infection. The disease had already been spread around the country as a result of animal 
movement, mainly sheep, through markets and dealers (Anderson, 2008).  
Within a month of the outbreak, FMD has spread to France, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands; however the primary focus of the TACTIC case study is in Cumbria, England. 
Cumbria is a county in north western England bordering Scotland. Cumbria is a rural area 
and livestock farming, tourism and outdoor recreation are mainstays of the economy. 
Cumbria was at the epicentre of the epidemic; it suffered 893 disease outbreaks, was the 
second longest affected region, and FMD reduced the economy of Cumbria by an estimated 
£266 million (4% of the GDP of the County) with roughly £130 million (roughly 41%) loss 
of the normal livestock output of the County and roughly £200 million suffered from tourism 
losses (Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Report, 2002).  
Major changes occurred to animal disease policy following the 2001 epidemic. The 
Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) was developed and replaced 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food as the lead government institution in charge 
of managing exotic notifiable animal diseases including FMD. DEFRA manages the 
operational response strategy and local response is led by the Local Disease Control Centre 
(LDCC), managed by Regional Operations Directors (RODs), and operational management is 
supported through Divisional Operational Managers (DOMs). Contingency planning was 
redesigned across Government, DEFRA, Animal Health, and the devolved administrations of 
Scotland and Wales, and continues to be revisited following consequent epidemic events 
(Anderson, 2008). Despite many positive improvements in policy and preparedness since 
2001, community engagement and building trusted relationships with local stakeholders still 
requires improvement (Anderson, 2008). Furthermore, it is recognized that there is not ‘one 
size fits all’ communications strategy, and risk communication is an area requiring further 
attention.  
TACTIC’s case study aims to gain an understanding of perceived changes in 
management at the community-level, and management culture that might have occurred in 
reaction to the 2001 event. This will have a particular focus on the involvement of members 
of the wider community who were affected then (e.g. the public, the agriculture industry, the 
tourism sector, etc.) and who are likely to be affected in any subsequent or similar events. 
 
2.0 Methods 
Government and public inquiries, reports, and academic articles on lessons learnt or related 
impacts of FMD were reviewed to provide context for the epidemic workshops. Two 
workshops on epidemic preparedness were hosted in Cumbria, UK in March and November 
of 2015. Informal interviews and meetings were conducted with local researchers, DRM 
practitioners, and organizations engaged in farming and agriculture. Further details on 
workshop objectives, participants and outcomes can be found in the technical workshop 
reports (Shreve et al. 2015; Shreve and Fordham, 2016). 
 
2.0 Results 
2.0.1 Literature review 
The majority of lessons learnt studies focused on government handling of the event, but from 
a variety of stakeholder perspectives (Table 1). Communication emerged as the primary 
challenge across studies reviewed. Response time, mixed messaging, misinformation, and 
conflict emerged as common themes for communication challenges. The need for greater 
engagement with public health emerges as a secondary theme in lessons learnt, but one that is 
emphasized in workshops and interviews. 
 
[insert table 1 here] 
 
2.0.3 Workshop findings 
The fist workshop confirmed communications were a challenge during the 2001 FMD 
epidemic, providing greater detail and specificity then is available in lessons learnt.  
Furthermore, communication challenges identified in lessons learnt tend to be from the 
government perspective, referring to internal communication challenges within agencies, or 
challenges with IT systems. Specific communication methods were highlighted in the 
workshops, for example, radio played an important role in communications in the 2001 
epidemic, as fewer people had Internet or mobile phone access, and sensationalism of the 
disaster by the media (portraying graphic images of animal carcass disposal), discouraged 
many residents from using the Internet. It was noted, however, that increased Internet and 
mobile phone usage could be better utilized in present day, especially to address challenges 
with delays in information sharing between actors, and addressing network fragmentation that 
occurs during disease control measures such as animal movement bans. Families, businesses, 
and agencies experienced disruptions to their normal networks during the 2001 epidemic. 
Children were kept from school and farmers and other workers were isolated from their 
businesses. This resulted in social isolation, and strain and fragmentation within agencies 
responding to the crisis. Long delays in receiving risk communication (hours to days) or other 
guidance from relevant government sources were reported.  
Another communication challenge that emerged from the literature, and also in 
workshop discussions, pertains to knowledge of farming practice and institutional turnover. 
The scale of the 2001 epidemic rapidly overwhelmed contingency plans requiring a rapid 
influx of external resources (Anderson, 2008). On shorter timescales, the organizational 
landscape shifted quite rapidly from primarily vets and farmers being involved to the military 
and then a mass influx of frontline workers. Communications with different organizations 
were challenging for residents because many workers were temporary and most had 
inadequate knowledge of farming, which further slowed communications. One participant 
recalled, for example, a government worker asking ‘what sex is your bull?’ On the 
international level, educational initiatives through European Union’s commission on Foot-
and-Mouth Disease have arisen to rapidly train veterinary staff on how to deal with FMD. 
However, a lesson still to be learnt is to provide educational initiatives to train all staff 
involved with response on wider farming (e.g. ‘natural practice’) and public health issues of 
animal diseases. During the second workshop, two local Cumbrian residents received an 
award for developing a training initiative to educate local police to be able to distinguish 
different breeds of sheep, as livestock theft has been a problem in the region. Co-production 
of knowledge between government and local community members to develop this type of 
training and make it readily accessible could help to improve preparedness and may further 
contribute to capacity building and establishing trust with government officials. 
Discussion of epidemic preparedness strategies employed during 2001, and 
perceptions of change since that time, recommend that biosecurity measures are a significant 
focus. Uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of different preparedness activities was 
identified as a concern. The effectiveness and potential environmental impacts of washing 
down vehicles and road surfaces, for instance, was raised as a concern. Some biosecurity 
measures required contracting of services through different vendors, many who were not 
familiar to the local community, nor were there any trusted baselines of fees for services 
provided. Whilst the availability and quality of biosecurity guidance has improved, much is 
available now through the DEFRA website, for instance, increasing transparency in 
biosecurity procedures, including contracting and cost requirements, could be beneficial. 
Community-led coping strategies also emerged during the crisis, however these 
activities are not widely recognized as preparedness activities recognized in contingency 
planning. Informal networks such as voluntary help-lines and support services, and ad hoc 
community messaging services, played and important role in coping during the event. 
Examples such as the Pentalk network, an educational and support initiative that was founded 
in the Penrith area of Cumbria, provided fee computers and IT training to those affected 
during the height of the epidemic in March 2001. It rapidly spread to the whole of the County 
gaining more than 2400 Cumbrian farmers in its membership. Run by a voluntary charitable 
company, financial support was drawn from government, educational, business and charitable 
sources. Pentalk helped farmers to communicate more effectively online and develop their IT 
skills to improve their farm businesses. Whilst Pentalk has ended, it can be used as a case 
study regarding good practice for identifying and addressing communication needs during an 
epidemic.  
Conflict was another theme that emerged in workshop discussions, especially 
regarding heterogeneous impacts of the 2001 FMD event and compensation. It was 
recommended that compensation for losses accrued as a result of disease control measures 
should be more thoroughly examined to ensure fairness and avoid wastage. Where some 
farmers may have profited economically, as compensation payments exceeded the livestock 
market value, others received less compensation than it would cost them to re-stock. 
Compensation values do not reflect other significant costs during the 2001 FMD crisis 
including infrastructure, human resources (vets, slaughter teams, disposal teams), other 
materials (e.g. pyre materials, etc.) and anecdotal evidence recommends there was much 
wastage (Convery et al., 2008). Compensation for services rendered during the disaster was 
also unequal; some slaughtermen reported earning £13.50 an hour, money they could not 
hope to match in normal working circumstances, while an apprentice farrier whose employer 
had little work because of restrictions earned £5 an hour for very unpleasant disposal work 
dragging out carcasses.  
Tourism was also severely impacted by the FMD epidemic. Countryside tourism in 
Cumbria and throughout Northern England is intrinsically linked to farming—tourism 
marketing efforts are strongly centered on the picturesque farming landscape, tourism 
activities frequently center around animal shows or fairs, and many farmers have diversified 
their farming businesses with tourism, for example, building hotel and restaurant 
accommodations on farms. Total revenue to tourism was reduced by £200m with an 
additional £60m estimated in indirect effects in Cumbria (Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease 
Inquiry Report, 2002). Revenue losses for non-farming businesses in rural areas amounted to 
billions of pounds—Central Government allocated £39 million pounds to a Business 
Recovery Fund but paid £1.34 billion in compensation to farmers for loss of livestock during 
the crisis (Donaldson et al., 2006). 
Public health impacts of the 2001 FMD epidemic were not well recognized by 
government sources. Government channels did not report a significant increase in the demand 
of mental health and wellbeing services in affected areas, however the demand was present 
(Cumbria Foot and Mouth Disease Inquiry Report, 2002; Mort et al., 2004; Bailey et al., 
2006). The government acknowledged that this was partially due to lack of proper reporting 
mechanisms. Informal support services such as help-lines and voluntary counselling services 
that arose locally did record a significant demand in mental health and wellbeing needs. The 
Cumbria Stress Information Network ran a 24-hour phone help-line which received 
thousands of calls during the outbreak with frequency increasing from a normal level of a few 
calls a month to up to 50 a day (Graham, 2001: 110-111). It was recommended that public 
health needs arising from epizootic events may not be reflected by formal health care services 
alone, therefore it is necessary for informal services, such as crisis counselling or help-line 
services, to be consulted to record impacts and assess local needs.  
Workshop participants also recommended that there seemed to be failures in engaging 
public health expertise, for example resources such as Public Health England (PHE), to 
manage public health implications of the event. PHE played an active role in Ebola response 
in West Africa, and H1N1 ‘swine flu’ pandemic influenza in 2009 provides another example 
when public health was brought to the fore. Very different strategies and mechanisms were 
used for disease management for public health, however there is a general failing to engage in 
knowledge exchange between public health and veterinary sciences.  
A study researching the public health impacts of the 2001 FMD epidemic found 
numerous public health implications (Mort et al., 2004). Researchers engaged citizen’s panels 
as a consultative mechanism to understand public health impacts of the 2001 event. 
Participants kept weekly diaries throughout the study (December 2001-June 2003), engaged 
in group discussions, and in-depth interviews at the start of the study (Bailey et al., 2006: 
159). Public frustration and outrage over disease control measures led to conflict, with much 
of the blame being channelled toward government workers. Many government workers 
reported feeling traumatized by the experience of frontline work, as well as animosity 
directed at them over disease control measures. Public meetings served as an avenue for 
residents to voice frustrations and raise concern over disease management, however, such 
meetings also increased risk of disease transmission. Many residents, and consequently, 
frontline workers, experienced a range of mental health impacts including anxiety, 
depression, and long-lasting feelings of bereavement. Respondents sought out care and 
support for these impacts locally, through informal support, practical advice, financial 
assistance from each other, and from voluntary organizations, and anonymous, emotional 
support from rural telephone help-lines (Bailey et al., 2006: 161).  
While the physical epidemiology of FMD is well mapped by the government, the 
‘citizen’ epidemiology is poorly reflected in contingency planning, and mental health impacts 
continue to be overlooked. ‘Lifescapes’ are presented as a method for capturing what 
respondents reported in terms of their everyday lives, to convey the localized, social-spatial 
public health impacts of the disaster (Bailey et al., 2006). The use of lifescapes and citizens 
panels were recommended as actions to support preparedness and promote citizen 
engagement by participants in the first workshop. Workshop participants recommended that it 
is also necessary to recognize that it may be a very painful experience for residents to revisit 
traumatizing events, and to focus on the future mindful of lessons learnt.  
 
4.0 Discussion 
4.0.1 Practical measures for the UK 
Results of the case study recommend that, while much progress has been made in the 
management of animal disease epidemics regarding operational response led by the 
government, animal disease management remains largely soiled outside of community-level 
DRM. Preparedness measures and contingency plans focus largely on biosecurity or 
phytosanitary measures, and veterinary sciences. These are necessary and important, 
however, they ignore the potential human and environmental impacts of animal diseases, and 
opportunities for citizen engagement in preparedness.  
Greater diversity is needed in risk analyses, for instance, considering costs and 
benefits of epidemics to different groups of people, businesses, institutions, and with regards 
to environmental sustainability. Costs tend to be calculated in economic terms, and from the 
perspective of government or agricultural industry, however studies also show the significant 
public health impacts. Practical measures to begin this dialogue could be engaging the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, in their capacity at facilitating international trade 
agreements, and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory reforms, in their 
capacity at facilitating economic policy and trade could help to advise on business continuity 
for agriculture, tourism, and other local businesses influenced by trade policy, as this is more 
of a concern for epidemics compared to other hazard types. Engaging with the Public Health 
England to facilitate ‘bottom-up’ public health strategies such as those presented in Bailey et 
al. 2006 can improve epidemic preparedness for both human and animal disease epidemics.  
Furthermore, public health expertise for managing public health impacts of ‘animal’ diseases 
can be strengthened.  
Greater exchange across boundaries (disciplinary, hazard, institutional, geographic, 
livelihood, etc.) would facilitate more integrated DRM strategies, and better promote 
community engagement in existing strategies. While more holistic mitigation measures such 
as agri-environment, organic, and regionalized/localized branding schemes, aimed at 
shortening the food supply chain and improving environmental sustainability, are available in 
the UK (see Curry, 2002), these strategies are not well emphasized in the day-to-day DRM 
context. Raising awareness of the cost, prevalence, and relationship of TADs, and producers’ 
and consumers’ abilities to engage in risk reduction through mitigation options, should be a 
focus for DRM. The success, for instance, of localized or branding schemes depends on both 
consumer and producer buy-in (Donaldson et al., 2006).  
Whilst beyond the scope of the current paper, which focuses on Cumbria, additional 
complexities arise from differences in institutional structure among different countries in the 
UK. In Scotland the ‘extent of administrative and legislative transfer allowed the Scottish 
Executive to manage the outbreak in a way that the ‘Lessons to be Learned’ inquiry 
recognised as better than elsewhere’ (Scott et al., 2004: 2). In contrast, the weaker framework 
for devolution was a problem for Wales, leading the responsible Minister to complain 
publicly that ‘although local responsibility rested with him, overall powers of decision-
making remained in Westminster, leading to the worst of all possible outcomes (Jones, 
2001)’ (Scott et al., 2004). Social differences including values and beliefs among different 
countries in the UK were also evident in recovery plans. The Welsh Rural Recovery Plan 
rejected the course set out by the UK government, viewing the proposed emphasis on  
“efficient” agriculture as environmentally damaging and instead choosing to place emphasis 
on the importance of the social and cultural fabric of Welsh rural society as a whole (Welsh 
Assembly Government, 2001), as can be evidenced in part by investing more monies in non-
farm business recovery, marketing and development for tourism businesses, and other 
measures to tackle rural stress compared to other countries in the UK such as England (Scott 
et al., 2004). Evaluation of the priorities and performance of devolved administrations, 
assessment of community capabilities, or consideration of other hazards the community faced 
is limited for epidemics and other hazards in the UK context with some exceptions. In other 
words, many concerns regarding localism, such as the effectiveness of community 
organizing, social equity, or longer-term resilience, are not well addressed for different 
hazard types, or for a ‘multi-hazard’ DRM approach.  
 
4.0.2 Potential contribution of TACTIC 
This article has reviewed TACTIC’s epidemics case study, which engaged a diverse group of 
local stakeholders to reflect back on lessons learnt since the 2001 FMD epidemic to improve 
preparedness to future epidemics in the context of community-level DRM. Workshop 
participants confirmed that many positive gains have been made to animal disease policy in 
the UK, however there are opportunities to motivate wider citizen engagement and promote 
epidemic preparedness in the context of DRM. Specific preparedness needs and activities are 
identified that could improve preparedness for both human and animal diseases by facilitating 
a more coordinated response between local communities and government, and better manage 
the public health impacts of ‘animal’ diseases.  
Preparedness and risk communication findings from the case study were used to 
inform the development of TACTIC’s self-assessments for the general public and for 
organizations. TACTIC’s tools can be used by members of the general public to assess their 
preparedness levels and to share risk perception and risk communication needs and 
preferences anonymously with local organizations. The organizational self-assessment has an 
additional focus of helping to develop, or improve, an organization’s risk communication 
strategy, for example, helping to identify strengths and weaknesses regarding specific 
communication aims (i.e. warning, raising risk awareness, enhancing capacities to act, and 
solving conflicts and building trust), and choosing appropriate communication methods (i.e. 
graphic aids, face-to-face communication, SMS, etc.) suited for communication aims and 
end-user needs. All users receive a feedback report on self-assessment questions detailing the 
scientific rationale, and tailored recommendations for preparedness from the ‘good practices’ 
library. The ‘good practices’ library is intended to serve as an idea bank, providing examples 
of preparedness activities geared at the community-level.   
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